

without any specific Member being mentioned.

The following proceedings occurred in the House on July 9, 1992,⁽³⁾ during consideration of House Resolution 513 (the rule providing for consideration of H.R. 5518, Department of Transportation appropriations for fiscal year 1993):

MR. [ROBERT S.] WALKER [of Pennsylvania]: . . . The problem is that the Democratic leadership and the Committee on Rules that they control are so weak and pathetic that they cannot stand up for honor and they cannot stand up for law. . . .

Why can you not at least have the guts to stand up for real deficit reduction and for the budget process? . . .

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE:⁽⁴⁾ Members are reminded to refrain from characterizing the actions or motivations of other Members of the House.

§ 62. —Questionable Motives

Members may not in debate impugn the motives of other named Members in the performance of their legislative duties.⁽⁵⁾ A rea-

3. 137 CONG. REC. p. ____, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.

4. Michael R. McNulty (N.Y.).

5. A Member must avoid personality in debate. Rule XIV clause 1, *House Rules and Manual* § 749 (1995).

In the early practice of the House the Speaker customarily intervened

sonable difference of opinion on the intent of another Member in offering a bill or debating a proposition may be stated,⁽⁶⁾ as may an opinion on the general motives of the House or a political party in adopting or rejecting a proposition.⁽⁷⁾ But an assertion that a Member's use of the legislative process is motivated by personal gain or is deceitful is not in order.⁽⁸⁾

Generally

§ 62.1 It is a breach of order in debate to impugn the motives of other named Members.

On Feb. 7, 1935, certain language was used in the Committee

in debate to prevent even the mildest imputation on the motives of Members; see 5 Hinds' Precedents §§ 5161, 5162.

6. Compare §§ 62.2–62.5, *infra*.

Purposely misquoting a Member's remarks is a breach of order. See 5 Hinds' Precedents § 5150.

7. See § 62.7, *infra* (motive of political party).

If words used to describe the motive of the House are objectionable in themselves, they are a breach of order; see § 65.6, *infra* (characterization of amendment as "demagogic" and "racist").

8. See § 62.8, *infra*; 5 Hinds' Precedents §§ 5147, 5149; 8 Cannon's Precedents § 2546.

of the Whole charging that Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, of Tennessee, and former Speaker Henry T. Rainey, of Illinois, in the past had committed dishonest acts and repudiated and ignored the rules of the House in the course of presiding.⁽⁹⁾

Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, objected to the words uttered by Mr. George H. Tinkham, of Massachusetts, and demanded that they be taken down. When the committee rose and Speaker Byrns resumed the Chair, he appointed Speaker Pro Tempore John J. O'Connor, of New York, to preside.

In defense of the words, Mr. Frederick R. Lehlbach, of New Jersey, stated as follows:

Mr. Speaker, the right of free debate in a parliamentary assemblage is the one privilege which the minority in such a body has, and which no deliberative assembly, certainly no English-speaking assembly, has ever sought to abridge or suppress.

Unparliamentary language is the use of abusive epithets or abuse or improper and excessive use of words, but it does not extend to criticism of anybody connected with the Government or characterization of the acts so criticized, and that is all that is involved here. It is a criticism of what the gentleman charges was done, and it is entirely aside from the question of

whether that charge is true or not as to whether the language is unparliamentary. The gentleman has a perfect right to charge that in the conduct of any kind of detail of the function of government certain acts were performed by certain officials. He has the right to condemn those acts, and he has the right to characterize them in any way he sees fit as long as he confines the language in which he makes his criticism to language ordinarily used by a gentleman.

The Speaker Pro Tempore ruled that the language used was a breach of order, since "It is well established under the precedents of the House that it is out of order in debate to arraign the motives of Members. Of course, the Speaker is a Member of the House."⁽¹⁰⁾

Inconsistency in Motivation

§ 62.2 A statement in debate that "consistency is a virtue of small minds" was held not to reflect on the motives of any Member of the House and not to be unparliamentary.

On Apr. 11, 1962,⁽¹¹⁾ Mr. Wayne L. Hays, of Ohio, delivered the following words in debate in relation to Mr. H. R. Gross, of Iowa: "I say

9. 79 CONG. REC. 1680, 1681, 74th Cong. 1st Sess.

10. The Speaker referred to a precedent set on Apr. 19, 1934, 78 CONG. REC. 6947, 6948, 73d Cong. 2d Sess.

11. 108 CONG. REC. 6374, 87th Cong. 2d Sess.

you have your definition of consistency. My definition is that consistency is a virtue of small minds." Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, ruled as follows:

In the opinion of the Chair, both Members were talking about a definition and each definition might apply to others outside the House. The Chair sees nothing about the words taken down that impugns the motives of any Member.

Attributing Legislative Position to Improper Motives

§ 62.3 A statement in debate accusing another Member of attacking the intent to enfranchise men in the Armed Forces was held in order as not impugning the motives of the Member.

On Dec. 15, 1943,⁽¹²⁾ Mr. John E. Rankin, of Mississippi, demanded that the following words used in reference to him by Mr. Vito Marcantonio, of New York, in debate be taken down:

The gentleman from Mississippi saw fit to make an attack on the President's Committee for Fair Employment Practices and also to state his viewpoint with regard to the soldiers' vote bill. Throughout the gentleman's speech the gentleman rests his attack

on the Committee for Fair Employment Practices as well as his attack on the attempt to enfranchise the men in American uniform on what he deemed to be the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson.

Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas, ruled as follows:

The Chair read the statement and then listened to its reading and the Chair can hardly think that the language of the gentleman from New York was more than expressing his opinion of the attitude of the gentleman from Mississippi. The Chair very seriously doubts that it is a violation of the rules of the House or a direct charge impugning the gentleman's motives or impugning his character.

§ 62.4 A statement in debate accusing a Member of attempting to deprive men in the Armed Forces of the right to vote was held to transgress the rules and to be a breach of order in debate.

On Dec. 20, 1943,⁽¹³⁾ the following words used by Mr. Adolph J. Sabath, of Illinois, in debate in relation to Mr. John E. Rankin, of Mississippi, were demanded to be taken down:

I said that I did not care whether it was my bill, his bill, or any bill; but that it should be a bill that will give them the right to vote [men in the

12. 89 CONG. REC. 10737, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.

13. 89 CONG. REC. 10922, 10923, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.

armed forces] and not a bill that will deprive them of that great privilege as the gentleman from Mississippi is trying to do.

Speaker Pro Tempore John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, ruled as follows:

The Chair feels that the question is very close to the line, but does transgress the rules when the gentleman from Illinois used the words “deprive them” in that those words tend to impugn the motives of the gentleman from Mississippi.

A Member may take the floor and make as vigorous an attack as he desires on any bill and its merits, but when it comes to the question of impugning the motives of another Member, one has to be exceedingly careful. Many times these questions are very close, and the Chair is frankly of the opinion that this is a very close question. But in order to preserve that understanding among Members which is so essential in a legislative body, the Chair is of the opinion that the words used, while very close to the line, tend to transgress the rules of the House.

§ 62.5 A statement in debate accusing another Member of past opposition to “every bill necessary for the defense of our country” was held to be an expression of opinion and not unparliamentary.

On Mar. 16, 1949,⁽¹⁴⁾ Mr. John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts,

14. 95 CONG. REC. 2651, 2652, 81st Cong. 1st Sess.

delivered the following words in debate in reference to another Member: “Before Pearl Harbor the gentleman was opposed to every bill necessary for the defense of our country.” Mr. John E. Rankin, of Mississippi, to whom the words referred, demanded that the words be taken down.

Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas, stated that he had always been in favor of a wide range of discussion and expression of opinion in debate; he ruled that the words objected to expressed an opinion, not fact, and were therefore not in violation of the rules of the House.

§ 62.6 While remarks in debate may not impute questionable personal motivations to a Member for his legislative positions, it is permissible to address political motivations for legislative positions in a manner not constituting a personal attack on a Member.

On Jan. 24, 1995,⁽¹⁵⁾ Mr. Dan Burton, of Indiana, was given permission to address the House for one minute and to revise and extend his remarks:

MR. BURTON of Indiana: Mr. Speaker, the people of this country spoke last

15. 141 CONG. REC. p. ____, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.

November. But it is apparent to anyone who is paying attention to what is going on in this House that the Democratic Party is doing everything they can to derail the Contract With America. They are proposing hundreds of amendments to slow down the process. All I want to say is that it is the height of hypocrisy, the height of hypocrisy for the Democrats to come down here and complain about what the Republicans are doing after the way they have run this House for the last 40 years.

MR. [JERROLD L.] NADLER [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I demand that the gentleman's words be taken down. . . .

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE:⁽¹⁶⁾ The Chair is prepared to rule.

It would be out of order for the gentleman to make reference to a particular Member, but precedent suggests that reference to procedures, or amendments, or to parties is not out of order. . . .

MR. NADLER: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry. . . .

The second half of the statement of the distinguished gentleman made reference to the hypocrisy of the Democrats. The context clearly indicated that it was the Democratic Members of the House that he was referring to. My parliamentary inquiry, therefore:

Since the rules prohibit the impugning of motives of Members of the House, and the gentleman impugned the motives of a group of Members of the House, just under half the Members of the House; so is it not permitted under the rules then to impugn

the motives of an individual Member of the House, but to impugn the motives of a group of Members of the House is permitted?

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE: The Chair believes that collective political motivation can be discussed and it was not discernible that it was relating to any particular Member.

The scope of permissible discussion of motivation was further clarified by the Chair on Mar. 8, 1995,⁽¹⁷⁾ in his response to a parliamentary inquiry. The Committee of the Whole had under consideration H.R. 956, to establish legal standards and procedures for product liability litigation:

MR. [THOMAS L.] BLILEY [Jr., of Virginia]: . . . I will point out to the gentleman on the other side that between 1973 and 1988 product liability suits in Federal courts increased 1,000 percent. In State courts, the increase was between 300 and 500 percent. One estimate of the total cost of these suits is \$132 billion a year. . . .

To the gentleman from Massachusetts I would say, when we were accused today in a bill that we passed overwhelmingly with bipartisan support for securities litigation reform, that we were bringing this because we were rewarding our fat cats, maybe some of us might beg to say that the gentleman on the other [side] might be trying to defend them.

Mr. Chairman, that may be one of the reasons that they so vociferously

16. Christopher Shays (Conn.).

17. 141 CONG. REC. p. ____, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.

defend the current system is that one of the heaviest contributors to their campaign coffers are the trial lawyers of the United States. . . .

MR. [JOHN] BRYANT of Texas: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry. . . .

Do the rules prohibit implying a motive or the improper motive on the part of your adversary in debate for presenting legislation?

THE CHAIRMAN:⁽¹⁸⁾ The rules of the House prevent Members from engaging in personal attacks.

MR. BRYANT of Texas: I thank the Chair. But my further inquiry was, do the rules prohibit you from implying a prohibited motive, unsavory motive for offering amendments for advocating legislation?

THE CHAIRMAN: The rules do not prohibit Members from engaging in discussions of political motivation.

MR. BRYANT of Texas: What about motivations that relate to your personal occupation or your personal sources of income?

THE CHAIRMAN: The rules prohibit Members from engaging in personal attacks.

Opportunism as Motive

§ 62.7 A statement in debate that a Member was leading the Republican party in a policy of opportunism was held not to transgress the rules of the House or reflect upon the integrity of Members and therefore to be in order.

18. David Dreier (Calif.).

On Feb. 8, 1941,⁽¹⁹⁾ the following words used by Mr. John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, in debate were demanded to be taken down by Mr. Clare E. Hoffman, of Michigan:

The gentleman from New York who was leading the Republican Party in the policy of opportunism that is being engaged in in connection with a bill serious to the fate of our country relating to our national defense.

The Committee of the Whole rose and the words were reported to the House. Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas, ruled that the words did not reflect upon the integrity of any Members and were therefore not violative of the rules of the House.

Personal Gain as Motive

§ 62.8 Where a Member charged another with opposing a rent bill because he was a landlord, the Speaker ruled the reference a breach of order.

On Apr. 17, 1936,⁽²⁰⁾ during consideration of a District of Columbia rent bill in the Committee of the Whole, Mr. Marion A. Zioncheck, of Washington, stated as follows:

Mr. Chairman, there has been a bad rumor running around the town that

19. 87 CONG. REC. 796, 77th Cong. 1st Sess.

20. 80 CONG. REC. 5647, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.

the reason the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Blanton] objects to this bill is that he is a landlord.

Mr. Thomas L. Blanton made a point of order against those remarks, and Chairman William B. Umstead, of North Carolina, ruled as follows:

. . . The gentleman from Washington will confine his remarks to the amendment which he offered and avoid personalities, and please proceed in order.

Following another personal remark by Mr. Zioncheck, the Chairman again reminded him that he could not indulge in personalities.

§ 62.9 While it may be appropriate in debate to characterize the effect of an amendment as deceptive or hypocritical, the Speaker has ruled out of order words taken down in Committee of the Whole characterizing the motivation of a Member in offering an amendment as deceptive and hypocritical.

During consideration of the Department of Education Organization Act of 1979 (H.R. 2444) in the Committee of the Whole, certain words used in debate were reported to the House and ruled out of order by the Speaker. The proceedings of June 12, 1979,⁽¹⁾ were as follows:

1. 125 CONG. REC. 14461, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.

MR. [HENRY B.] GONZALEZ [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I expected resistance to this amendment and not necessarily my getting involved. I am not a member of this committee. But this amendment is probably the most detrimental to the main purposes of equal opportunity of education to the most needed segments of our society that has been presented thus far and probably could ever be presented. The insidiousness of the amendment is compounded by the sponsor's deceptive—I should say hypocritical—presentation of this amendment, disguising it as a quota prohibition.

MR. [ROBERT S.] WALKER [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I demand that the words be taken down.

THE CHAIRMAN:⁽²⁾ The Clerk will report the words objected to. . . .

The Committee will rise. . . .

THE SPEAKER:⁽³⁾ The Clerk will report the words objected to.

The Clerk read as follows: . . .

The insidiousness of the amendment is compounded by the sponsor's deceptive—I should say hypocritical—presentation of this amendment, disguising it as a quota prohibition.

THE SPEAKER: The Chair is ready to rule.

The Chair, having read the references concerning deception and hypocrisy, will state that there have been previous opinions by the Chair that there is nothing wrong with using the word, "deceptive," or the word, "hypocritical," in characterizing an amendment's effect but when a Member so

2. Lucien N. Nedzi (Mich.).

3. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).

characterizes the motivation of a Member in offering an amendment that is not in order.

Consequently, the words in the last sentence read by the Clerk are unparliamentary and without objection, the offensive words are stricken from the Record.

—Party Motivation in Offering Question of Privilege

§ 62.10 Reference in debate to the minority party as “having some motivation other than fully objective concern for the House in the timing of a resolution” and the assertion that the House could proceed with “greater dignity and honor” at another time, together with the disclaimer that the Minority Leader did not necessarily share that motivation, was held not to impugn the motives of any Member and to be parliamentary.

During consideration of House Resolution 578 (directing the Committee on Rules to make certain inquiries) on Feb. 13, 1980,⁽⁴⁾ the following proceedings occurred in the House:

MR. [RICHARD] BOLLING [of Missouri]: Mr. Speaker, I send to the desk a privileged resolution (H. Res. 578)

4. 126 CONG. REC. 2768, 2769, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.

and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 578

Resolved, Whereas it was reported in the public press on February 9, 1980, that, “The House of Representatives this week lost a secret effort in court to obtain a ruling that congressmen do not have to respond to federal grand jury subpoenas for House records;” . . .

Therefore be it resolved, That the Committee on Rules be instructed to inquire into the truth or falsity of the newspaper account and promptly report back to the House its findings and any recommendations thereon. . . .

MR. BOLLING: . . . The gentleman from Missouri has not felt more strongly about a matter in a very long time than he does about this. . . . The gentleman from Missouri obviously has no difficulty with the content of the resolution and feels that he could in honor offer it. The gentleman from Missouri has a very, very strong feeling about the timing of the offering of this proposal by the minority, and the gentleman from Missouri has carefully differentiated between what he has said earlier about the minority leader and what he is now saying about the minority.

I fear me, and I do not suspect the gentleman from Arizona of having this view, I fear me that there is some motivation other than fully objective concern for the House in the timing of the resolution, not in the content. And that is the reason that the gentleman from Missouri took the unusual course of offering the minority’s proposition. He

feels that it is appropriate for the House, through the Rules Committee initially, to look into this matter. But he thinks it might be done with greater dignity, and one might say with greater honor, if it were not done at this particular time of confusion. . . .

MR. [ROBERT E.] BAUMAN [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, I demand that the words of the gentleman from Missouri be taken down. . . .

If the record is read back by the Clerk, I believe the Chair will find that the gentleman from Missouri referred to the motivation behind the offering of this resolution at this time and referred to the minority leader and the members of the minority party. Subsequent to that the gentleman from Missouri referred to that motivation being dishonorable. I think this falls within the rules of the House that clearly say that a Member of the House cannot question the motivation of other Members of the House in their actions. The gentleman from Missouri did refer to the minority leader, and all of the Members of the minority and their motivation.

THE SPEAKER:⁽⁵⁾ The Clerk will report the words. . . .

The gentleman from Missouri has referred in his remarks that he feels that it is appropriate for the House, through the Rules Committee, initially to look into this matter, and he thinks it might be done with greater dignity and, one might say, with greater honor if done by the committee or considered at another time.

The Chair, in its opinion, feels that he has not transgressed on the honor or the dignity of the minority party or

the minority leader, and the point of order is not well taken.

The gentleman from Missouri.

MR. BAUMAN: Mr. Speaker, would the Chair address himself to the issue of motivation the gentleman from Missouri raised, as to whether that is a correct use of parliamentary language.

THE SPEAKER: In the opinion of the Chair the gentleman did not talk about or refer to the dishonor of any Member of the House, nor did he characterize the motives of any specific Member in an unparliamentary way.

The Chair repeats, the point of order is not well taken.

Indirect Derogatory Reference

§ 62.11 Under Jefferson's Manual,⁽⁶⁾ it is not in order during debate to refer to a particular Member of the House in a derogatory fashion, and the Chair will intervene to prevent improper references where it is evident that a particular Member is being described although not named.

The following proceedings occurred in the House on Oct. 28, 1981:⁽⁷⁾

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE:⁽⁸⁾
Under a previous order of the House,

6. See *House Rules and Manual* § 361 (1995).

7. 127 CONG. REC. 25723, 25725, 97th Cong. 1st Sess.

8. Nick J. Rahall, 2d (W. Va.).

5. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).

the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Bliley) is recognized for 60 minutes. . . .

MR. [THOMAS J.] BLILEY [Jr., of Virginia]: . . . Mr. Speaker, my constituent is disgusted and I am disgusted. Disgusted to think that any Member of this House would sanction the use of his signature on this kind of scurrilous fabrication. Yes, outright fabrication. . . .

MR. [DANIEL E.] LUNGREN [of California]: . . . [People] who asked for our trust and the trust of the American people in solving the problem, are telling us now that what the President is trying to do is destroy the system, and one party, one party will save it and make it a partisan issue.

Unfortunately, the signer of this terrible appeal for cash is a most distinguished member of the Committee on Aging.

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE: The Chair would advise the gentleman to confine his remarks to parliamentary and legislative issues and not refer to Members of the body individually.

Parliamentarian's Note: Mr. Lungren's reference had been to the chairman of the Select Committee on Aging, Mr. Claude Pepper, of Florida, and in the context of the full special order containing remarks relating to unidentified members of the majority party who had solicited campaign funds under the guise of a "Social Security Notice", the reference to Mr. Pepper was unparliamentary. Mr. Lungren revised his remarks to delete any reference to the chairman, over whose signature the

controversial letter in question had been mailed out.

Challenging Motive of Minority Party

§ 62.12 A demand that words be taken down (in this instance, language arguably impugning the motives of other Members) is untimely if further debate has intervened.

The following proceedings occurred in the House on Mar. 4, 1985,⁽⁹⁾ during consideration of House Resolution 97 (to seat Richard D. McIntyre as a Member from Indiana):

MR. [ROBERT H.] MICHEL [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, I rise to a question of privilege.

Mr. Speaker, I send to the desk a privileged resolution (H. Res. 97) and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 97

Whereas a certificate of election to the House of Representatives always carries with it the presumption that the State election procedures have been timely, regular, and fairly implemented; and . . .

Whereas the presumption of the validity and regularity of the certificate of election held by Richard D. McIntyre has not been overcome by any substantial evidence or claim of irregularity: Now, therefore be it

9. 131 CONG. REC. 4277, 4283-85, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.

Resolved, That the Speaker is hereby authorized and directed to administer the oath of office to the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Richard D. McIntyre. . . .

MR. [WILLIAM V.] ALEXANDER [of Arkansas]: Mr. Speaker, I move that the resolution be referred to the Committee on House Administration. . . .

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE:⁽¹⁰⁾ The gentleman is entitled to 1 hour under that motion, during which time the gentleman from Arkansas controls the time. . . .

MR. [WILLIAM D.] FORD of Michigan: . . . Mr. Speaker, this issue is being handled now in a manner being allowed in this House that does not meet the dignity of this body which is very much needed at the moment. At the time that the people of this country are wondering whether or not the Congress is going to do the things that are necessary, some of them painful, to protect our country, we have Members playing petty politics over there in a way that is calculated to do nothing except destroy public confidence in this body.

I can see how people would lose confidence in the House, which is put into this kind of mess by this bushwhacking method of causing a vote. . . . [W]e count on assertions from our leaders on both sides that on particular days you can take care of other important matters because there will not be rollcalls. They know that many of the Members are being deprived, who have been seated, of representing their districts because of the way in which this vote is called up. And if they want to show good faith at

this point, Mr. Speaker, then the gentleman should withdraw his motion and move to take it up at a time when due notice has been given so that my constituents and all of the districts in Michigan will have their representative here to vote on them. . . .

MR. [CARROLL] CAMPBELL [Jr., of South Carolina]: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry. . . .

Mr. Speaker, am I correct in saying that we do not seek to impugn the motives of a Member when they bring a matter to the floor? Is that correct under the way this House operates? And that when a Member's motives have been impugned that that Member or others on their behalf would have a right to ask that words be stricken? Is that a correct assumption?

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE: The gentleman is correct that no Member's motive is to be impugned by another Member in the course of orderly debate on the House floor.

MR. CAMPBELL: Well, Mr. Speaker, my concern lies with the fact that with the previous speaker that the motivation of those of us who are concerned with this matter may have been impugned when the accusation was made that this was being done under petty politics and that it was bushwhacking and instead of the motivation of trying to protect legitimately the rights of a Member of the minority party who had been denied, though being certified, his seat.

To make that charge I raise the point of order does impugn the motivation of those of us who seek to seat Mr. McIntyre. I ask that the gentleman's words be stricken.

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE: The gentleman's point of order in this par-

10. James C. Wright, Jr. (Tex.).

ticular instance comes too late. Intervening debate has proceeded.

MR. CAMPBELL: The gentleman who previously spoke, Mr. Speaker, I was on my feet asking to be recognized on a point of order, who had made those accusations.

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE: The Chair will state the Chair expects all Members to maintain the dignity of the Chamber, and that includes the proper use of language in reference to their colleagues of either political party.

The Chair will state that the point of order made by the gentleman at this time is not timely made. But the Chair will instruct all Members with the expectation that parliamentary language will be observed.

§ 63.—Falsehood

A Member may assert in debate that the statement of another Member is untrue,⁽¹¹⁾ provided that no accusation of intentional misrepresentation is made.⁽¹²⁾ Any

11. See §63.3, *infra*. See also 5 Hinds' Precedents §5159.

12. See the statement of Speaker Joseph W. Byrns (Tenn.) at §63.3, *infra*. For past rulings, see 5 Hinds' Precedents §§5158 ("That is not true, and he knows it" held in order), 5160 ("Bold and direct attack upon truth" held out of order by vote of Senate); 8 Cannon's Precedents §2545 ("The devotion of the gentleman . . . to the truth is so notorious that I shall not reply" held out of order).

term or language implying a deliberate misstatement of the truth, for whatever motive, is unparliamentary,⁽¹³⁾ including allegations of insincerity,⁽¹⁴⁾ and hypocrisy.⁽¹⁵⁾

Allegations of Express or Implied Falsehood

§ 63.1 The Speaker ruled that the word "canard" meant falsehood and was out of order in debate when referring to another Member.

On May 11, 1949,⁽¹⁶⁾ Mr. Emanuel Celler, of New York, stated in debate in reference to Mr. John E. Rankin, of Mississippi, "Mr. Speaker, I cannot let the occasion go by without commenting on the canard that the gentleman from Mississippi was guilty of when he

Charges of deliberate falsehood against persons who are not Members are in order; see 8 Cannon's Precedents §2532.

13. See §§63.4 ("false and slanderous"), 63.5 ("lies and half-truths"), *infra*; §61.2, *supra* ("cover up wrongdoing"). See also 8 Cannon's Precedents §2530 ("liar").

14. See §63.7, *infra*; 5 Hinds' Precedents §5148.

15. See §63.6, *infra* ("hypocrisy" linked to "falsehood"); compare 8 Cannon's Precedents §2542.

16. 95 CONG. REC. 6042, 6043, 81st Cong. 1st Sess.